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District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton        
                 
                        
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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(Opinion filed: August 3, 2017) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Andres Sanchez appeals the District Court’s order affirming a decision by the 
Commissioner of Social Security denying Sanchez’s application for disability insurance 
benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security 
Act.1  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Sanchez claims to have suffered a disability starting on December 31, 2006, as a 
result of a workplace accident in which he twisted his back.  On September 22, 2011, 
Sanchez filed the underlying applications for disability benefits and supplemental social 
security income.  Both were denied without a hearing on December 29, 2011, and again 
upon reconsideration on June 5, 2012.  Sanchez then filed a request for a hearing before 
an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was granted on July 24, 2012.  The hearing, at 
which Sanchez and a vocational expert testified and detailed medical reports were 
submitted, was held on June 21, 2013. 
 The ALJ found that Sanchez suffered from a series of severe impairments in his 
spine and neck, as well as one severe impairment in his right knee.  The ALJ declined, 
however, to find that Sanchez’s spinal issues compromised any nerve roots or his spinal 
cord.  The ALJ further found that Sanchez’s diminished vision in his right eye did not 
constitute a severe disability, pointing to the strength of vision in Sanchez’s left eye.  
Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that Sanchez “remained able to sit, stand, 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §§401-434, 1381-1383. 
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walk, and carry,”2 and thus had a residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 
“sedentary, unskilled work with sit/stand option [sic] [that would not require] lifting more 
than five pounds . . ..”  Finding that such work existed in significant numbers in the 
national economy, the ALJ denied both of Sanchez’s applications.  The Appeals Council 
denied review. 
 Sanchez then sought review of the ALJ’s decision in the District Court, which 
found that the ALJ’s factual determinations as to the nature and extent of Sanchez’s pain 
and as to Sanchez’s RFC were supported by substantial evidence.  This appeal followed. 
II.3 
 Sanchez raises three issues on appeal.  First, he claims that the ALJ’s RFC 
determination was not supported by substantial evidence.  Second, Sanchez contends that 
the ALJ erred in finding that suitable employment existed in significant numbers in the 
national economy.  Third, Sanchez claims that the District Court did not adequately 
address his opposition to the ALJ’s conclusions.  Because our review of the underlying 
ALJ’s decision follows the same standard as did the District Court’s review,4 our 
conclusion to affirm the ALJ’s  denial of benefits renders a review of this third contention 
unnecessary.   
                                                 
2 The ALJ also noted that Sanchez uses a cane but pointed to Sanchez’s own admission 
that he can walk around indoors without the cane in finding that Sanchez can still walk. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 
421(d), and 1383(c)(3).  We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the 
ALJ’s finding that Sanchez was not disabled as of the date of the hearing.  Brown v. 
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
4 Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
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A. 
 We first address whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC 
determination, which found that Sanchez could “perform sedentary work as defined in 20 
C.F.R. [§§] 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a),” but “[could not] work at heights or with 
machinery due to reduced binocular vision” or “lift more than five pounds,” and “must 
alternate between sitting and standing at his election.”  As we have explained previously, 
“substantial evidence” need not be a preponderance; rather, we will affirm so long as 
there is sufficient evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”5 
 Sanchez argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination fails to meet this standard 
because the ALJ (1) failed to consider Sanchez’s visual impairment in the RFC 
determination, (2) ignored Sanchez’s ambulatory difficulties and overstated his ability to 
remain seated, and (3) inadequately considered Sanchez’s testimony as to pain.  Sanchez 
also asserts a blanket argument that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his decision.  
None of these arguments persuade us that the ALJ committed any error.  The ALJ’s 
decision explicitly discussed Sanchez’s visual impairment, finding that he failed to 
establish a loss of central visual acuity within the meaning of the regulations, but 
nonetheless modifying Sanchez’s RFC to reflect that he “cannot work at heights or [with] 
machinery due to reduced binocular vision.”  Similarly, the ALJ noted Sanchez’s 
ambulatory difficulties, finding that “the claimant used a cane for ambulation, which was 
                                                 
5 Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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prescribed by his private doctor primarily outside for walking, standing, and support.”  
The ALJ then explained his view that this was not an extreme limitation, based on the 
fact that Sanchez can walk in the house without a cane.  While Sanchez correctly notes 
that there is some evidence to the contrary, there is adequate evidence in the record to 
support the ALJ’s conclusion.  The same is true of Sanchez’s testimony as to pain.  After 
finding Sanchez’s testimony not entirely credible, the ALJ determined that Sanchez’s 
back, neck, and leg pain could be accommodated in a workplace.  Here, unlike the cases 
cited by Sanchez, the ALJ fully credited the competent medical evidence, which the ALJ 
then determined did not lend support to the full extent of Sanchez’s claimed pain.  We 
find no error in the ALJ’s analysis in this respect.  
B. 
 We turn next to the question of whether the ALJ erred in concluding that a 
significant number of jobs in the national economy exist for someone with Sanchez’s 
RFC.  At the outset, we note that the vast majority of arguments Sanchez raises with 
respect to the vocational expert’s testimony are premised on his argument that the ALJ 
misstated his RFC; having rejected this contention above, we consider only those 
arguments which exist independent of the ALJ’s RFC determination.  Sanchez’s only 
such argument is that the three types of jobs on which the ALJ based his vocational 
decision could not be done by someone with Sanchez’s RFC.6 
                                                 
6 To the extent that Sanchez’s briefing can be read to criticize the ALJ’s failure to submit 
all of Sanchez’s limitations to the expert, “[w]e do not require an ALJ to submit to the 
vocational expert every impairment alleged by a claimant” so long as “the hypotheticals 
posed . . . ‘accurately portray’ the claimant’s impairments . . ..”  Johnson v. Comm’r of 
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 After listening to Sanchez’s testimony and independently questioning Sanchez at 
the hearing before the ALJ, a vocational expert determined that Sanchez could work in a 
“small hand packaging-type position,” in a “small products assembly-type position,” or 
as a “patcher.”  The expert further testified that, taken together, approximately 37,000 
such positions existed in the national economy.  All of these jobs, the expert testified, 
would allow Sanchez the option to sit and stand at his election.  Sanchez argues that the 
ALJ erred in crediting this testimony, as the vocational expert testified that small 
products assembly requires a degree of near visual acuity and that patching and small 
hand packaging could involve lifting more than five pounds, both of which are foreclosed 
by Sanchez’s RFC. 
We hold that the ALJ did not err in finding that Sanchez had sufficient visual 
acuity to perform small products assembly.  Contrary to Sanchez’s contention, the ALJ’s 
determination that Sanchez retained 20/70 vision in his better eye did not preclude any 
employment which could require a degree of visual acuity.  Indeed, Sanchez’s attorney 
specifically asked the vocational expert for further clarification about the degree of visual 
acuity required for small products before determining that Sanchez could do such work.  
Further, Sanchez admitted that he retains enough visual acuity to operate a motor vehicle 
alone.  On this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 
determination that Sanchez retained sufficient visual acuity to perform small products 
assembly.  The vocational expert testified that 18,000 small products assembly jobs exist 
                                                                                                                                                             
Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 
546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original). 
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in the national economy, and precedent suggests that this is sufficiently “significant” to 
support the ALJ’s decision.7 
Because Sanchez had sufficient visual acuity to perform small products assembly, 
we see no reason to reverse even if the ALJ failed to exclude those hand-packaging and 
patching jobs that would have required lifting more than five pounds.8  Indeed, even if all 
hand-packaging and patching jobs were to have been excluded, the existence of a 
significant number of small products assembly jobs supports our decision to affirm.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the ALJ’s denial of benefits was 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Thus, we will affirm. 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding 10,000 jobs in 
the national economy “significant”). 
8 The vocational expert’s testimony was that “the packaging [jobs] may require lifting 
above five pounds” and that “[t]he patcher may be over five pounds.”   
